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Abstract
As the U.S. housing crisis worsened in 2007, and through 2008, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) headed towards insolvency. At the same time, contractions in private
securitization resulted in these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) purchasing
nearly half of all new mortgages. In July, the government passed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) to provide a more effective regulator and to address public
uncertainty regarding whether the government would back the GSEs’ assets and liabilities.
HERA provided Treasury and the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
with the framework needed to stabilize the distressed firms, which by then collectively held
or guaranteed over $5 trillion in mortgages and mortgage-related securities. On September
6, the FHFA placed the GSEs into conservatorships and Treasury took steps to ensure their
solvency. The steps taken by the government pursuant to HERA avoided the collapse of the
GSEs and the concomitant collapse of the U.S. housing market, but did not address the longerterm issues inherent in the GSEs’ structure, which remain unresolved as the firms remain in
conservatorship.

This case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in
detail the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs:
1

•

“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008” by Daniel Thompson.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson and Adam Kulam.
•
“The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Benjamin
Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, and Andrew Metrick.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Daniel Thompson - Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
3 The author would like to thank Adam Kulam and Lily Engbith for their contributions.
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The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008: United States Context
GDP
$14,681.5 billion in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
converted to USD)
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
GDP per capita
$47,976 in 2007
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$48,383 in 2008
converted to USD)
$47,100 in 2009
Sovereign credit rating (5-year
As of Q4 2007/2008/2009:
senior debt)
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking system
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009
Size of banking system as a
62.9% in 2007
percentage of GDP
68.3% in 2008
66.9% in 2009
Size of banking system assets as a
29.0% in 2007
percentage of financial system
30.5% in 2008
assets
30.3% in 2009
5-bank concentration of banking
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
system
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009
Foreign involvement in banking
22% of total banking assets in 2007
system
18% of total banking assets in 2008
19% of total banking assets in 2009
Government ownership of banking
system
Existence of deposit insurance

0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in
2008
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in
2009
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
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I. Overview
Note: This article addresses how HERA changed the government’s relationship with Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. It briefly mentions HERA provisions relating to the Federal Home Loan Banks,
another GSE, but does not discuss HERA’s other functions.
Background
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are large government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
public-private corporations specially chartered by Congress to enhance the liquidity of the
U.S. secondary mortgage market and thereby promote access to mortgage credit, particularly
among low- and moderate-income households and neighborhoods (FCIC 2011, 15). The GSEs
pursue their mission by buying mortgages conforming to their underwriting standards,
guaranteeing payment of the underlying mortgages and packaging the mortgages into
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) which they sell to investors (FCIC 2010, 15). They also
purchase private-label MBS (PLMBS), which invest in nonconforming mortgages that they
hold in their portfolios (FCIC 2010, 23). The GSEs fund their operations by issuing debt and
they enjoy a robust market with their debt being widely held.
The firms are publicly traded for-profit companies whose shares are favored by investors
large and small. They are governed by their Boards of Directors and shareholders but enjoy
numerous advantageous because of their hybrid structure.4 Although not direct components
of the U.S. government, they were often assumed to have the backing of the government due
to a number of factors including: their housing mission, their government charter, their
favorable statutory treatment, and the $2.25 billion backup credit line that each had from
the Treasury Department (CBO 2010; FCIC 2010, 16). Their debt issuances enjoy a favored
status among investors, banks, and even the Federal Reserve, similar to debt issued directly
by the government (Frame et al. 2015). This “implied government guarantee” of their debt
and obligations has been very beneficial to the GSEs in a number of ways including a lower
cost of funding in terms of interest paid on debt securities and premiums paid on guarantees
of GSE MBS (FCIC 2010, 16; GAO 1996).
GSE Regulation Before July 2008. Several prominent federal officials expressed concerns
about the efficacy of GSE regulators at least a decade before the crisis (Bernanke 2012, 8). In
2004, Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that the GSEs’ massive balance sheets, dominant
role in secondary mortgage, regulatory exemptions, and lack of market discipline created
systemic risk in the housing market (Greenspan 2004). During his tenure as Chairman, Ben
4 The GSEs are publicly traded and privately owned and governed by their Boards of Directors and shareholders

but enjoy numerous advantageous because of their hybrid structure. “These statutory benefits include (1)
exemption from state and local taxes, (2) a line of credit with the U.S. Treasury up to $2.25 billion, (3) eligibility
of their debt to serve as collateral for public deposits, (4) eligibility of their securities for Federal Reserve openmarket purchases, (5) eligibility for their corporate securities to be purchased without limit by federally
regulated financial institutions, (6) assignment of mortgage-related securities they have issued or guaranteed
to the second-lowest credit risk category at depository institutions, and (7) exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission” (Jickling 2007).
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Bernanke echoed Greenspan’s concerns, adding that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s low
capital limits posed a risk for the housing market and the economy (Paulson 2010, Ch. 1;
Bernanke 2015, Ch. 11).
Prior to HERA, Congress had tried and failed to pass legislation to strengthen the GSEs’
regulators or create a stronger regulatory agency (Frame and White 2004, 89-93). From the
passage of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Soundness and Safety Act in 19925
until the passage of HERA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were regulated using a two-tiered
system: the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which operated as an independent agency within
HUD (Frame and White 2004, 88-89).
HUD monitored the GSEs’ commitment to the mission stated in their charter and was charged
with determining whether the Enterprises had adequately supplied the secondary mortgage
market with loans, particularly for lower-income families and underserved areas (Fishbein
2003, 6-8). HUD, which reviewed new mortgage program proposals from the GSEs, was
required to authorize the programs within 45 days of their submission (Fishbein 2003, 6).
Under this supervisory process incoming requests were approved by default (unless proven
to be unauthorized, not in the public interest, or high-risk) if not rejected by HUD within the
45-day period (Fishbein 2003, 5). Due to its regulatory burden, HUD occasionally chose to
not review new GSE programs, such as the GSEs’ decision to begin purchasing subprime
mortgages for their portfolios (Fishbein 2003, 5).
OFHEO regulated the safety and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Frame and
White 2004, 88). As part of its duties, OFHEO examined the GSEs’ financial health, established
risk-based capital standards, and ensured the GSEs’ compliance with the capital standards
(Frame and White 2004, 88). OFHEO used three capital standards to evaluate the GSEs: a
risk-based standard, a minimum capital standard, and a critical capital standard (Frame and
White 2004, 98). The risk-based standard was intended to consist of enough capital to cover
the interest, credit default, and operational risks plus an additional 30% of capital surplus
(Frame and White 2004, 98). The established minimum capital standard was 2.5% of assets
on the balance sheet and 0.45% of off-balance-sheet assets (Frame and White 2004, 98). The
critical capital standard was set to 0.25% of on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet assets
(Frame and White 2004, 98). OFHEO could seek disciplinary action if the GSEs violated
capital standards or the law, which the agency did following the discovery of accounting
errors in the early 2000s, but the agency had no authority to change such standards (Frame
and White 2004, 90-91, 98-100).
OFHEO’s authority and decision to conduct an intervention depended on the GSEs’ ability to
meet the three capital standards. Based on this capital assessment, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac fell into four categories of increasing risk: adequately capitalized, undercapitalized,
significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapitalized (Frame and White 2004, 99).
OFHEO’s authority was prescribed by the standard of capitalization of the GSE:

5

12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.
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1. If a GSE met all three criteria, it was classified as “adequately capitalized” and
required no further action.
2. If the GSE could not meet the risk-based standard, it was considered
“undercapitalized,” which required the GSE to submit a capital restoration plan to
OFHEO and prohibited the GSE from distributing more capital in the short-term.
3. If the GSE failed to meet both the risk-based and minimum capital standards, it was
“significantly undercapitalized,” which carried the same restrictions as the
undercapitalized classification, and additional growth restrictions.
4. If the GSE met none of the three capital standards it was considered “critically
undercapitalized,” which permitted OFHEO to place the GSE into conservatorship
(Frame and White 2004, 99).
Prior to HERA, however, conservatorship was not considered a viable option because OFHEO
lacked a mechanism to finance a conservatorship and had no power to delegate losses
between debtors and creditors (Frame et al. 2015, 18). In addition, OFHEO was not
authorized to initiate a receivership6 (Frame et al. 2015, 5).
When the mortgage market began to contract during the summer of 2007, OFHEO loosened
their portfolio limit and lowered their capital surplus requirements to ensure that the GSEs
continued to provide the market with liquidity (FCIC 2011, 310-12). OFHEO raised the GSEs’
investment portfolio cap from approximately $728 billion to $735 billion in September 2007
and abolished the cap altogether in March 2008 (FCIC 2011, 312-313). It lowered the capital
surplus requirement from 30% to 20% in March 2008 (and from 20% to 15% for Fannie Mae
in June 2008), with an understanding that the GSEs would use these loosened restrictions to
raise capital (FCIC 2011, 314-315). While Fannie Mae was able to raise $7.4 billion in capital
in May, Freddie Mac failed to do so (FCIC 2011, 315).
Despite OFHEO’s efforts to mitigate the GSEs’ losses, many critics considered it unable to
handle the full extent of the crisis (FCIC 2011, 314-315). Ever since its inception in 1992, and
increasing overtime as the firms grew, many observers believed that OFHEO’s structure and
regulatory practices were inadequate to its assigned task (FCIC 2011, 314-315). The agency
could not adjust the GSEs minimum capital requirements, as the 1992 statute mandated that
they remain at 2.5% and 0.45% of on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet assets,
respectively (Frame et al. 2015, 5). OFHEO required annual congressional appropriations to
function, which subjected the regulator to political interests, particularly because Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac had substantial congressional lobbying teams (Frame et al. 2015, 5).
In 2003, then Treasury Secretary John Snow testified before the House Financial Services
Committee that there was “a general recognition that the supervisory system for the housing

The key distinction between a conservatorship and a receivership is that the former process is intended to
manage the entity through a reorganization or rehabilitation, preserving its assets, and the latter is intended
to manage the wind-down or resolution of the entity (Jester et al. 2018, 7-8).
6
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GSEs neither has the tools, nor the stature, to effectively deal with the current size,
complexity, and importance of these enterprises” (Frame and White 2004, 89).
Market Instability in 2007-08. When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to post billion-dollar
loses at the end of 2007, it became more apparent to government officials that the firms’
decision to purchase (and to continue to purchase) risky loans could destabilize the GSEs
and, by extension, the entire financial system (FCIC 2011, 309-312). Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac’s worsening health increased public concerns about whether the government would
guarantee their assets (FCIC 2011, 314-316). In the words of Tim Geithner (then President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York [FRBNY]), “just about everyone except their
captured regulator [OFHEO] agreed [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] were woefully
undercapitalized” (Geithner 2014, Ch. 5). Market concerns increased on July 7, 2008, when
a Lehman Brothers analyst released a report speculating that Fannie and Freddie would not
be able to raise the required capital in light of weak market conditions for their stock and the
possible effect of a new accounting standard that would require the firms to bring their offbalance sheet entities onto the balance sheet (Paulson 2010; Wingfield 2008). The GSEs’
common share prices dropped by more than 16% as a result (Lockhart 2008).
In July 2008, at Fannie Mae’s and Treasury Secretary Paulson’s requests, the Federal Reserve
Board invoked its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,
enabling the FRBNY to extend a provisional line of credit to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(FCIC 2011, 316-317; FRB 2008). This also allowed the Fed—in cooperation with the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—to conduct its own investigation into the GSEs for
the first time (FCIC 2011, 317). The review revealed that the GSEs were more financially
unstable than previously suspected and might soon become insolvent (FCIC 2011, 317).
Treasury also hired a team from Morgan Stanley to review Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
business operations; their assessment corroborated the Fed and OCC’s conclusions (FCIC
2011, 317).
Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, and OFHEO director James Lockhart increased their
lobbying efforts for legislation to create a new regulator that could rescue the GSEs from
insolvency, stabilize them, resolve their regulatory issues, and quell general uncertainty in
the market (FCIC 2011, 316-317). On July 13, 2008, Secretary Paulson testified before
Congress, requesting “GSE reform legislation . . . to have a strong independent regulator that
will inject confidence into those institutions and into the markets” (Paulson 2008). Paulson
stressed that the new regulator should have the financial capacity—with the backing of
Treasury—to stabilize the GSEs (Paulson 2008). Offering an analogy to support his request,
Paulson argued that Treasury required a “bazooka” that it could threaten to use to increase
confidence in the stability of the agencies (FCIC 2011, 316-317).
Program Description
On July 30, 2008, the government passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).
Among other things, the bill merged OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance Board, and HUD’s
GSE Oversight Team into the newly created Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and
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enabled the FHFA and its new director, James Lockhart, to exercise significantly increased
authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac7 (FHFA 2008, 15).
Beginning in August 2008 and continuing during the first three months of the
conservatorship, the FHFA absorbed employees from OFHEO, HUD, and the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB); the move interfered with FHFA’s ability to act as conservator (FHFA
2008, 15). Under HERA, OFHEO and the FHFB had a year to wind down their operations and
integrate into the FHFA (HUD’s non-GSE-related duties would remain operational) (FHFA
2008, 15). However, the FHFA’s decision to enact a GSE conservatorship seems to have
accelerated this process to less than three months; the FHFA absorbed all OFHEO and FHFB
employees and operations by October 27, 2008 (FHFA 2008, 15). The FHFA later reported
that overseeing the GSEs as conservator while simultaneously managing a major
reorganization integrating new employees and operations had created “administrative and
cultural challenges in merging information technologies and systems, financial and human
resources functions, and operational differences” (FHFA 2009, 30). In effect, the FHFA was
stressed with creating itself at the same time that it was charged with managing the GSEs
and stabilizing the U.S. mortgage market.
Enhanced Safety and Soundness Regulation
Like OFHEO, the FHFA could restrict asset growth if it found a GSE to be undercapitalized
(Frame and White 2004, 99; HUD 2008; HERA 2008). However, the FHFA could also adjust
minimum and risk-based capital standards (Frame 2009, 10; HERA 2008, 111-12). The FHFA
could use cease-and-desist authority and remove company officers (HUD 2008). It was also
given power to review and approve the GSEs’ new products (previously the authority of
HUD) (HERA 2008, §1121-23; HUD 2008). The FHFA no longer needed congressional
approval for its budget, providing it increased latitude (Frame 2009, 10).
Based on the severity of the GSEs’ undercapitalization, the FHFA could restrict their capital
distributions, force them to change their leadership, or—in the most severe cases of
undercapitalization—place them in a conservatorship or a receivership (HERA 2008, §1145;
HUD 2008). After enacting a conservatorship, the FHFA could stabilize Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac by any means necessary and could access funds from the Treasury if needed
(Jickling 2008, 2-3). The conservatorship provision in HERA was intended to be similar to
the power of the FDIC over insolvent depository institutions, but unlike bank regulators, the
FHFA did not need to resolve the insolvency at the lowest possible cost (Jickling 2008, 2).

7

HERA also designated the FHFA director to serve as director of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), which
are a collection of 11 banks that lend to institutions, mainly commercial banks and thrifts, for purposes related
to housing (FHFA 2008, 23-26; HERA 2008, Title II). The FHLBs experienced financial difficulties as the result
of contractions in the housing markets, but not to the same severity as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FHFA
2008, 3-6). HERA provided Treasury with the same emergency capability to stabilize the FHLBs that it allowed
for the GSEs (HERA 2008, Title II; HUD 2008). Treasury never exercised its emergency authority related to the
FHLBs (Frame et al. 2015, 17).
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After passage of HERA, FHFA continued to use statutory capital requirements to analyze the
health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which gave the impression that Fannie and Freddie
were more financially sound than they actually were (FCIC 2011, 318). Secretary Paulson
claims that this approach left the FHFA unable to access the capital needs of the market
(Paulson 2010, Ch. 1). Bernanke concurred with Paulson, adding that Federal Reserve
officials had warned the regulator that the GSEs’ capital limits were too low (Bernanke 2015,
Ch. 11). During this time, the GSEs capital levels were less than 2% (FCIC 2011, 309).
Consultation with the Federal Reserve
HERA recognized the role that the Federal Reserve played in regulating banks and financial
stability by requiring the FHFA director to “consult with the Fed chairman” regarding:
The risks posed by the regulated entities to the financial system, prior to issuing any
proposed or final regulations, orders, and guidelines with respect to the exercise of
the additional authority provided in this Act regarding prudential management and
operations standards, safe and sound operations of, and capital requirements and
portfolio standards applicable to the regulated entities (HERA 2008, §1118).
The director was also to consult with the Fed chairman regarding any decision to place a GSE
(including a FHLB bank) into conservatorship or receivership and to periodically share
information about with “capital, asset and liabilities, financial condition, and risk
management practices” of the GSEs and any information relating to financial stability (HERA
2008, §1118). This consultative relationship expired on December 31, 2009.
Treasury Funding
While the FHFA was the GSEs’ regulator, HERA enabled Treasury to serve as a potential
financial stopgap for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac during a conservatorship (HUD 2008).
Under Section 1117 of HERA:
Treasury is authorized to purchase any obligations and other securities issued by the
Corporation . . . , on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may determine and in
such amounts as the Secretary may determine. Nothing in this subsection requires
the Corporation to issue obligations or securities to the Secretary without mutual
agreement between the Secretary and the Corporation. Nothing in this subsection
permits or authorizes the Secretary, without the agreement of the Corporation, to
engage in open market purchases of the common securities of the Corporation.
Treasury could exercise its broad emergency powers once it determined that its actions were
necessary to:
1.

provide stability to the financial markets;

2.

prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and

3.

protect the taxpayer (HERA 2008; HUD 2008).
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Once it made this “emergency determination” Treasury could inject the GSEs with capital by
purchasing an unlimited amount of their securities or debt, provided, however, that such
authority was exercised prior to December 31, 2009, as also provided in the HERA (HERA
2008, §1117; Jickling 2008, 2-3).
The December date represents a compromise of design—unlimited authority but limited as
to time—which made the bill palatable to legislators who were thought unlikely to grant a
total blank check without any limits (Jester et al. 2018, 3-5). While this compromise
recognized that it was to be a temporary authority to address the emergency situation at
hand, it also acknowledged that the true scope of what might be needed to stabilize the GSEs
was unknown (Jester et al 2018, 9-10). Concurrent with the passage of HERA, the federal
debt ceiling was also expanded by $800 billion to $10.6 trillion to accommodate any
emergency financing (FCIC 2011, 317; Jester et al. 2018, 8-9).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also subject to additional guidelines, most prominently
conforming loan limits, which capped the maximum size of the loans that the GSEs could
purchase from originators (Frame et al. 2015, 2-3; HERA 2008, §1124). HERA also
established a new formula for calculating the GSEs’ conforming loan limit, which provided
the conforming loan limit would not exceed $417,000 for single-family units, and could be
adjusted annually based on housing prices (HERA 2008, §1124). The conforming loan limit
could not be reduced; only increased (HERA 2008, §1124).
The Rescue Plan
On September 7, 2008, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac near insolvency and facing liquidity
difficulties, Treasury and the FHFA (in consultation with the Fed, as required) announced a
four-part rescue plan to stabilize the firms: (1) place the GSEs into conservatorships8; (2)
enter into senior preferred stock agreements to guarantee the solvency of each GSE; (3)
establish a secured credit facility with each GSE; and (4) purchase GSE MBS (FHFA 2008, 911).
Figure 1: Programs Developed Using HERA
Name of intervention

Funding limit

Time limit

Conservatorships

Not applicable.

Unlimited

SPSPAs

Initially, $200 billion aggregate. Unlimited
Potentially unlimited.

Credit Facility

No limit stated.

To expire December 31,
2009

The FHFA took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under separate conservatorships. We herein discuss the two
conservatorships as one due to the similarities between the two structures.
8
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At the discretion of the Treasury To expire December 31,
Secretary. No limit stated.
2009

Sources: HERA; Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2008b, Treasury 2008c, Jester et al. 2019.
Conservatorship is “a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled institution with the
objective of returning the entities to normal business operations” (FHFA 2008a). The
decision to place the enterprises into conservatorship was based on a finding that they could
not independently “continue to operate safely and soundly and fulfill their critical public
mission” (FHFA 2008a). As conservator, the FHFA had broad authority to operate the firms
until they were stabilized and released form the conservatorships or put into receivership.
The second and third components of the rescue plan permitted the Treasury to inject longterm and short-term funding, respectively, into the GSEs to ensure that they remained
solvent (Frame et al. 2015, 16-17). Pursuant to the senior preferred stock purchase
agreements (SPSPAs), the Treasury received GSE preferred stock (paying a 10% dividend)
and a warrant to acquire 79.9% of the firms’ common stock for a nominal price in return for
providing draws to maintain a positive net worth for the GSEs9 (Frame et al. 2015, 16-17).
The final part allowed Treasury to purchase GSE MBS, which would help sustain Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in their key role as issuers (Frame et al. 2015 16-17).
While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac faced different problems (e.g. Freddie Mac had a larger
capital hole), the government decided to adopt the same approach to resolve both GSEs
(Paulson 2010, Ch. 1). In defense of treating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the same, Paulson
argued that the market saw them as the same, as the market believed both had the implicit
guarantee of the U.S. government (Paulson 2010, Ch. 1).
Outcomes
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to sustain significant losses until 2012, and often had
to draw funds under the SPSPAs to meet its liquidity requirements including funding the
dividend payments it made to Treasury (Frame et al. 2015, 17; Thompson 2021b). Prior to
2012, Treasury invested $187.5 billion in draws pursuant to the SPSPA (Frame et al. 2015,
16). It also purchased $225 billion GSE MBS (Frame et al. 2015, 17). The Fed invested an
additional $1,270.4 billion: $134.5 billion in GSE debt and $1,135.9 billion of GSE MBS
purchased (FHFA 2019).
In August 2012, the SPSPAs were amended to require that, in lieu of dividend payments, the
GSEs would pay all realized profits, after a stated capital buffer, to the Treasury (Thompson

The “keepwell” structure of the SPSPAs enabled the GSEs to continue to draw funding from Treasury even
after the December 31, 2009, deadline stated in the HERA (Jester et al. 2018). Generally, a keepwell
agreement is a contractual relationship between a parent company and subsidiary in which the parent
promises to maintain the subsidiary’s minimum regulatory capital (Jester et al. 2018). For details of this
structure see Thompson (2021b).
9
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2021b, sec. “Program Description”).10 Beginning in 2012 and continuing through to the date
of this case’s publication, the GSEs have posted annual profits. As of the fourth quarter of
2018, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have paid a combined $292.3 billion to Treasury in
dividends and have received $191.5 billion in draws (Frame et al. 2015, 17; Thompson
2021b).

II. Evaluation
HERA provided the tools that the government needed to stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in 2008. By doing so, the two GSEs were able to continue to support the U.S. housing
market by buying a substantial number of mortgages when private securitization had
evaporated.
Over the course of the conservatorship, GSE shareholders have filed several lawsuits
challenging the government’s sweep of profits pursuant to the 2012 amendment of the
SPPSA; lawsuits are still pending as of this case’s publication (Frame et al. 2015, 26; Hurley
2020).
Some critics have claimed that the continuing conservatorships have created uncertainty,
causing lenders to tighten their underwriting standards (Frame et al. 2015, 27-28). There
have been several proposals for reforming the GSEs by various constituencies, but no
resolution has emerged (Frame et al. 2015, 30). As of the date of this memo, the firms
continue to operate under conservatorship and the amended SPSPAs.
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